战争的代价:俄罗斯是否资金耗尽以继续战斗?

战争的代价:俄罗斯是否资金耗尽以继续战斗?

2025-12-04Business
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雷总
早上好 hanjf12,我是雷总,欢迎收听专为您打造的 Goose Pod。今天是12月5日,星期五。
董小姐
我是董小姐。今天我们来聊一个硬核话题:战争的代价:俄罗斯是否资金耗尽以继续战斗?
雷总
没错,最近很多人都在讨论这个。我们看到的数据显示,俄罗斯正面临着一场非常严峻的预算危机。这已经不是简单的财政紧张了,十月份的预算赤字就高达4000亿卢布,全年的缺口累计到了4.2万亿卢布,占到了GDP的1.9%。
董小姐
这些数字背后,就是实实在在的压力。打仗就是烧钱,没有钱,这仗还怎么打下去?问题的核心是,战争的巨大开销和西方制裁的双重打击,让他们的财政状况雪上加霜。钱从哪里来,成了最头疼的问题。
雷总
是的,这就形成了一个恶性循环。战争本身成本高昂,而因为战争引发的制裁,又切断了他们最重要的收入来源。你看,今年前10个月,来自油气产业的联邦税收就比去年同期下降了超过21%。这就像我们公司,核心产品突然被打了七折,但研发投入却还在不断加码。
董小姐
这个比喻很恰当。他们的乌拉尔原油,售价比布伦特原油低了将近20美元一桶,这个折扣太大了!这不是正常的市场波动,而是制裁的直接后果,拳拳到肉,打在了他们最疼的地方,那就是外汇收入。
雷总
而且这种财政压力是会传导的。我们看到,一些俄罗斯的主要地区,包括圣彼得堡,都开始大幅削减志愿兵的招募奖金,有的甚至削减了五分之四。这就像公司开始砍市场预算一样,说明是真的手头紧了。
董小姐
这是一个非常明确的信号。所以,前俄罗斯政府经济顾问弗拉基米尔·米洛夫说得很直接:要维持战争机器的运转,需要更多的钱,但问题是,钱根本就没有。看来,这个水井,真的快要见底了。
董小姐
当然,罗马不是一天建成的,俄罗斯的财政危机也不是突然出现的。要理解今天的困境,我们得把时间线拉长一点看。苏联解体后,他们的军费开支其实是断崖式下跌的,整个国家的军事工业都陷入了停滞。
雷总
我记得那段历史。到了1998年,他们爆发了严重的金融危机,就是所谓的“卢布危机”,那时候军费开支跌到了谷底,只有苏联时期的一个零头。可以说,那是一次彻底的“格式化”,一切推倒重来。
董小姐
对,一次非常痛苦的“重来”。但普京上台后,情况就完全不同了。从2000年到2021年,俄罗斯的军费预算增长了超过600%!从90多亿美元一路飙升到接近660亿美元。这是一种极其凶猛的扩张。我们做企业,追求的是健康增长,但这种速度,风险太高了。
雷总
这就像一个初创公司,连续拿到巨额融资,然后不计成本地疯狂扩张。到了2014年,他们的军费预算已经超过了任何一个欧洲国家,而且即便是在油价下跌的时候,这股扩张的势头也没有停下来。惯性太大了。
董小姐
但是,再强的势头也无法摆脱经济规律。现在,他们面临着自1999年以来从未见过的情况:预计将连续七年出现高额预算赤字。他们甚至已经公开放弃了将赤字控制在GDP的1%以下的目标。这是承认现实了。
雷总
这是一个重大的政策转向。就像我们程序员,承认一个核心架构有根本性问题,没办法再打补丁了,必须重构。这说明他们自己也承认,这个问题是长期的、结构性的,而不是暂时的困难。
董小姐
更关键的是,很多分析师都认为,官方的赤字预测还是“一厢情愿”。如果战争继续,赤字几乎肯定会继续扩大。而且,和90年代不同,那时候他们虽然困难,但还有国际合作这条路可以走。现在,他们基本上是被孤立的。
雷总
所以说,历史的背景让今天的危机显得更加凶险。过去二十年,他们一直在进行一场豪赌式的军备竞赛,现在,账单来了,却是在一个最糟糕的时间点,而且还没有外部的“银行”愿意给他们提供贷款,连中国都没有。
雷总
这就引出了一个核心的争论:西方的制裁到底有没有用?这个问题其实很复杂,不是简单的“是”或“否”就能回答的。我们看到,俄罗斯的经济并没有像一些人预测的那样迅速崩溃。
董小姐
确实没有。他们在战前是有准备的,搞了一个所谓的“堡垒俄罗斯”战略,积累了大量财政储备,还把资产从美元中分散出去。这一点,我们做企业的也要学习,必须有充足的现金储备来应对黑天鹅事件。
雷总
而且,制裁的推出是渐进式的,特别是在能源领域,这就给了他们适应和寻找变通办法的时间。他们迅速调整了贸易方向,欧洲不买了,中国和印度就成了他们石油的大买家。这是一个经典的“业务转型”。
董小姐
没错,还有一些国家,比如土耳其,扮演了“中间人”的角色,帮助俄罗斯绕过制裁,获得一些关键部件。这是一场全球性的猫鼠游戏。所以从这个角度看,制裁确实不是一颗能一击制胜的“银弹”。
雷总
但是,从另一个角度看,制裁的打击又是真实存在的。据估计,俄罗斯因此损失了大约1280亿美元的出口收入。并且,他们在军事上仍然严重依赖西方的技术和零部件。虽然可以通过第三方国家进口,但成本更高,可靠性也更差。这种“摩擦成本”会不断消耗他们。
董小姐
一点没错。制裁更像是一种消耗战。它可能不会给你一个决定性的重击,但会让你持续不断地失血。就像米洛夫说的,俄罗斯国内的高通胀和高利率,就是制裁的直接产物。这个经济规律,是谁也逃不掉的。
董小姐
那么,这一切对俄罗斯经济的真实影响是什么呢?可以说,这是一个“冰火两重天”的局面。表面上,政府把大量的钱投入到军事生产中,带动了GDP数字的增长。但这是战争经济,是以牺牲其他所有行业为代价的,根本不可持续。
雷总
对,这就像我们公司把所有资源都押在一个高风险项目上,其他业务线必然会萎缩。技术禁运就是一个例子。他们很难再获得西方的先进机械和零部件,汽车工业受到的冲击就非常大。虽然能找到替代方案,但代价就是成本更高、质量更差。长此以往,技术上就会落后。
董小姐
这就扼杀了他们未来的发展潜力。有报告直言,西方的制裁“葬送了俄罗斯的经济未来”。民众的生活水平也很难再有提升。而被冻结的数千亿外汇储备,更是釜底抽薪。那是他们的“保险”,现在这份保险没了。
雷总
所以,他们抵御风险的能力大大降低了。如果未来国际油价再次大跌,他们很可能会面临严重的货币危机和通货膨胀。手里剩下的人民币储备,并不能完全充当安全网。他们的处境,其实是越来越危险。
雷总
展望未来,他们的选择已经不多了。能用的牌基本上都打光了。他们已经提高了企业税,还计划提高增值税,但这些增加的税收对于巨大的战争开销来说,只是杯水车薪。
董小姐
在国内发债也不现实。利率那么高,债务成本会把财政压垮。那就只剩下最后一招了:开动印钞机。但这是一条通往恶性通胀的危险道路,很容易让人联想到1998年那场灾难性的金融崩溃。
雷总
所以,外部压力会越来越大。米洛夫就认为,西方需要继续施压,尤其是在能源上。他建议到2027年应该完全停止进口俄罗斯的液化天然气。这无疑将是又一次重击。
董小姐
看来,最终的策略就是让战争的经济成本变得高到无法承受。普京或许还在谈论对现代化军队的长期需求,但是,没有一个现代化的经济作为支撑,这一切都只是空谈。
雷总
总而言之,俄罗斯正陷入一场不断加深的财政危机。虽然今天还没有弹尽粮绝,但战争的巨大代价和西方的持续制裁,正让其维持战争的能力变得越来越困难。
董小姐
今天的讨论就到这里。感谢您收听Goose Pod,我们明天再见。

俄罗斯正面临严峻财政危机,战争开销与西方制裁双重打击下,油气收入锐减,预算赤字高企。尽管经济未迅速崩溃,但制裁正消耗其资源,扼杀未来发展潜力,民众生活水平受损。未来或面临印钞机风险,战争经济不可持续,维持战斗能力日益困难。

The cost of war: Is Russia running out of money to continue the fight?

Read original at The Kyiv Independent

A view of the full moon over the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow, Russia on June 4, 2023. (Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)In early October, the Russian government released the full draft of its 2026–2028 federal budget, outlining President Vladimir Putin's key policy priorities for the coming years.

In his report for the Free Russia Foundation think tank, shared with the Kyiv Independent, Russian opposition politician Vladimir Milov said Russia's budgetary situation is anything but "normal.""To keep (Russia's) military machine running like this, a lot more money is needed — and there simply is not any," Milov, who was an economic advisor for the Russian government in the early 2000s, told the Kyiv Independent.

The Kyiv Independent looked into the Russian budget draft to see if Russia is ultimately running out of money to feed into its war machine.Russia’s air defenses are wide open — there’s just one problemThe Kyiv IndependentTania MyronyshenaSeven years of deficitsAccording to the report, Russia is experiencing a full-blown budget crisis.

Vladimir Dubrovskiy, a senior economist at the Center for Social and Economic Research Ukraine, said the deficit is "Russia's most serious economic and political-economic problem."The country is facing seven consecutive years of high budget deficit (over 2%) — a streak unseen since 1999, according to Milov's report.

The Russian government has officially abandoned its goal of keeping the deficit below 1% of GDP.For 2025, the projected deficit was increased by 0.5% to a 2.6% total. The government expects the 2026 deficit to fall to 1.6% of GDP, but analysts say that projection is likely unrealistic."The deficit that Russia is expecting for 2025 is quite significant.

It is true that the planned deficit for 2026 is lower, but those numbers are wishful thinking," Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the KSE Institute, said.Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov (L) talks to Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina (R) at the Grand Kremlin Palace, on April 17, 2024 in Moscow, Russia.

(Contributor/Getty Images)Dubrovskiy also believes the projected figures are an underestimation."If the war continues, the deficit will almost certainly grow significantly, as it did in the past," he told the Kyiv Independent. "Moreover, this estimate does not take into account the potential impact of future economic sanctions."

Hilgenstock added that in any case, a deficit of 2-3% of GDP is "a lot for Russia since it doesn't have access to financing like normal countries."Moscow remains shut out of international financial markets due to sanctions, leaving it dependent on domestic borrowing and limited reserves. Even China, once seen as a potential lender, has refused to provide government loans.

Expensive warThis fiscal crisis affects Russia's ability to fund the war against Ukraine.The Kremlin has been forced — at least on paper — to cap further increases in military spending to keep its books in check. Yet the government no longer publishes real expenditure data, releasing only projections.

Between 2026 and 2028, Moscow claims defense spending will remain flat, falling slightly as a share of GDP from 6.3% in 2025 to 5.5% in 2026 and 2027, and further to 4.7% in 2028.Milov says the figures hide a deeper problem."The military-industrial complex is facing financial difficulties," Milov said.

"To keep it operating even at its current pace — without further cuts we've seen — is becoming increasingly difficult."Russian military personnel arrive to participate in the Victory Day military parade, to be held at Red Square, in central Moscow on May 9, 2023. (Kirill Kudriavtsev/AFP via Getty Images)Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec, Russia's largest arms producer, admitted in August that "the profitability of production remains low, and somewhere even zero, if not negative," leaving "not too many funds for development."

The result, Milov said, is that Russia can afford only a limited, low-intensity war.He noted that the current phase of the war is "not very intense" in terms of the use of military equipment like tanks, relying mostly on drone strikes, missile attacks, and localized offensives."This type of warfare they can sustain for some time," Milov said, "but the question is what for."

Cutting bonusesSeveral major regions — including Saint Petersburg, Samara, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan — have slashed recruitment bonuses for volunteer fighters, in some cases fivefold.Instead of launching a new mobilization, the Kremlin has leaned on financial incentives and recruitment campaigns, offering lucrative contracts to volunteers willing to fight in Ukraine.

Although these payments are drawn from regional, not federal, budgets, this trend reflects Russia's broader budget crisis, Milov noted, which severely limits the federal center's ability to provide financial assistance to the regions.Trump takes aim at Putin’s oil lifeline — China and India still hold the keyThe Kyiv IndependentTim ZadorozhnyyOut of optionsWith traditional funding routes exhausted, Russia is left with limited options to finance its budget deficit.

The liquid part of the National Wealth Fund — once Russia's main fiscal cushion — has dwindled to 4.2 trillion rubles ($50 billion), far short of the 5.7 trillion rubles ($70 billion) deficit expected for 2025 alone.Domestic borrowing through state bonds is also functionally impossible under current conditions, as yields on 10-year bonds exceed 15%.

The high cost of debt servicing offsets the amount that can be potentially raised.Mark Stalczynski, Senior Analyst at RAND, noted that the Russian government has raised taxes "to partially offset" defense spending since the beginning of the full-scale war.But while the government has resorted to extensive tax hikes — such as increasing the corporate profit tax to 25% and planning a value-added tax increase to 22% — the resulting revenue generated only a fraction of what's needed.

Russia’s military spending is projected to decline from 5.3% of its GDP to 4.7% by 2028 (Nizar al-Rifai/The Kyiv Independent)Therefore, the only remaining option the government seems to be resorting to is monetary emission — de facto Central Bank credit to the government, Milov noted."Large-scale domestic borrowing would further depress the economy and would immediately remind Russian elites of the disastrous 1998 financial collapse, which was caused by the same type of deficit financing at high interest rates," Dubrovskiy said.

How the West can squeeze Russia outAccording to Milov, Russia's deepening economic and budget crisis is a direct consequence of Western sanctions.He argued that Europe must accelerate phasing out of Russian energy — cutting imports of liquefied natural gas by 2027 and all other energy resources by 2028 to further disrupt Russia's war machine."

This is extremely important," he said, adding that gas supplies to Slovakia and Hungary, as well as LNG exports to Western Europe, remain among Gazprom's main sources of revenue."These deliveries bring Gazprom well over half of its total profit," Milov said.Vasily Astrov, a senior economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, believes Russia's worsening fiscal performance this year stems primarily from two factors — lower global oil prices and an overvalued ruble.

The ruble's strength has reduced revenues from energy exports once converted into the national currency, he told the Kyiv Independent.Dubrovskiy said that while the oil price cap, which sets the maximum allowable price for Russian seaborne oil exports, remains "the most significant measure" against Russia, it has not yet become fully effective.

Secondary sanctions and restrictions targeting specific Russian entities "have so far been largely symbolic," producing at best "one-off effects," according to Dubrovskiy."Until now, the global decline in oil prices has had the greatest impact," he said.Milov emphasized that Western sanctions — though not a single "magical measure," but rather a complex system of restrictions — are working."

High inflation and interest rates are, of course, a direct product of sanctions," Milov concluded.Can the West win a сeasefire with Russia?The Kyiv IndependentCatarina BuchatskiyNote from the author:Hi, this is Tim. The author of this article. Thank you for taking the time to read it. At the Kyiv Independent, we don't have a wealthy owner or political backing.

We rely on readers like you to support our work.If you found this article interesting, consider joining our community today.

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