“仅够糊口,无力挥霍”:摩根大通发现低薪劳动力市场正在挤压Z世代和低收入美国人 | Fortune

“仅够糊口,无力挥霍”:摩根大通发现低薪劳动力市场正在挤压Z世代和低收入美国人 | Fortune

2025-12-03Business
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雷总
早上好 hanjf12,我是雷总,欢迎收听专为您打造的 Goose Pod。今天是12月4日,星期四。
董小姐
我是董小姐。今天我们要聊一个非常现实的话题:“仅够糊口,无力挥霍”,看看摩根大通的报告揭示了低薪劳动力市场如何挤压美国的Z世代和低收入群体。
雷总
是的,这个报告的核心发现,用我们程序员的话说,就是数据拉出来一看,不太乐观。尽管失业率数字表面上看起来还行,只有4.4%,但家庭的“实际收入增长”这个关键指标却非常疲软,银行余额也基本没动。
董小姐
说白了,就是挣的钱没怎么变多,日常开销一涨,大家手里的活钱自然就少了。这报告里说,25到54岁人群的实际收入增长率只有1.6%,这水平跟十几年前经济大衰退刚过那会儿差不多,那时候失业率可是高达7%啊!
雷总
没错,这就形成了一个很奇怪的对比。而且这不仅仅是某个年龄段的问题,年轻人,本来应该靠着跳槽快速涨薪,现在没机会了。年纪大一点的,比如50到54岁的工人,一半人算上通货膨胀,收入其实是负增长。这就叫“高不成低不就”。
董小姐
我记得之前顶级投行瑞银也有个比喻,说现在的劳动力市场就像一个浴缸,裁员的“出水口”在变大,招聘的“进水口”在变小。这水池子里的水能多吗?年轻人找不到好工作,中年人担心被裁员,消费信心当然会下降。
雷总
这个比喻非常形象!摩根大通的报告数据恰好印证了这一点。很多家庭的银行账户余额看起来没怎么少,但一部分原因是他们把钱从活期账户转到了收益高一点的货币基金里。但这只是“左手倒右手”,总的现金储备并没有增加。
董小姐
所以报告的结论就是,大家揣着瘪瘪的钱包,准备过节。想买点好东西犒劳自己,也就是“ splurge”一下,恐怕是心有余而力不足了。这不仅仅是经济数据,这背后是无数家庭实实在在的生活压力。
雷总
没错。要理解为什么会这样,就得聊聊一个词,叫“K型经济”。这个词最近几年特别火。您可以想象一个字母“K”,它有一笔是斜着向上的,另一笔是斜着向下的。这就是我们现在经济状况的真实写照。
董小姐
对,一部分人,主要是高收入群体和那些持有大量股票、房产的人,他们的财富就像K的上一笔,蹭蹭往上涨。而另一部分人,大部分工薪阶层、小企业主,他们的处境就像K的下一笔,不断下滑,日子越过越紧。
雷总
这种分化其实不是今天才有的。从上世纪80年代开始,收入不平等的趋势就出现了,但疫情之后,这个“K”字张开的角度变得更大了。疫情期间,为了刺激经济,大量的钱被投放到市场,资产价格飞涨,有钱的人更有钱了。
董小姐
而普通人呢?他们可能拿到了一些短期的补贴,但很快就被通货膨胀给抵消了。我们做实业的最清楚,原材料在涨、物流在涨,什么都在涨,但你敢轻易给产品大幅提价吗?不敢,因为老百姓的消费能力就在那儿,你提价,他就去买更便宜的了。
雷总
是的,我们看历史数据,从2000年到2015年,整整15年,美国家庭收入的中位数几乎是停滞的。你想想,15年啊,一个产品的生命周期都迭代好几轮了,但很多人的收入还在原地踏步。这太可怕了。
董小姐
而且财富的差距比收入的差距更惊人。报告里提到,从2001年到2016年,只有高收入家庭的财富是增加的,中等收入家庭的财富缩水了20%,低收入家庭更是少了45%!这意味着什么?这意味着普通家庭抵御风险的能力变得非常脆弱。
雷总
完全正确。这就导致了一个现象,消费市场的增长,越来越依赖那一小部分顶端的人群。他们买奢侈品、去旅游,拉动了消费数据。但这个基础是非常不牢固的,因为大部分人的消费其实是在降级的。整个经济体的健康度,就像一个App,不能只看头部用户的光鲜数据,得看广大普通用户的活跃度和留存率。
董小姐
所以,这个“K型”的背景,就是理解当前Z世代和低收入群体困境的关键。他们不是不努力,而是在一个向下走的通道里,向上游变得异常困难。这就是结构性的问题,不是光靠个人奋斗就能轻易改变的。
雷总
是的,这就引出了一个核心的矛盾:一边是经济学家和报告里说的“K型分化”,富人越富,穷人越穷;另一边,社会上关于如何解决这个问题的争论也越来越激烈。这就像我们做产品,发现了用户的痛点,但对于用什么技术方案来解决,内部会有完全不同的声音。
董小姐
有什么好争论的?问题很明确,就是财富分配不均,普通人没有从经济增长中获得应有的好处。一些人提出,应该搞“全民基本收入”(UBI),就是政府直接给每个人发钱,保证一个最基本的生活水平。这听起来很美好,但钱从哪儿来?最后还不是从创造价值的企业和纳税人身上出?
雷总
董小姐您看问题的角度总是很犀利。这确实是争论的焦点之一。支持者认为,随着未来人工智能和自动化替代越来越多的岗位,直接发钱是维持社会稳定的必要手段。但反对者,就像您担心的,这会打击人们的工作积极性,而且可能引发更严重的通货膨胀。
董小姐
这不是可能,是一定会!你不用干活就有钱拿,谁还愿意去做那些又苦又累的基础性工作?我们制造业怎么办?社会运转靠什么?靠发钱是发不出核心科技的,也发不出一个强大的国家。必须鼓励劳动,鼓励创造价值。
雷总
我理解您的观点。所以还有另一派观点,认为重点不在于直接发钱,而在于“赋能”,也就是增强普通人的能力和机会。比如,建立一个强大的、人人都能参与的数字基础设施,让数据和金融工具更透明,让普通人也能通过合作社、或者现在流行的DAO,也就是去中心化自治组织,来拥有生产资料。
董小姐
这听起来太复杂了。老百姓关心的是下个月的房租、孩子的学费和口袋里实实在在的钱。你跟他讲那些新概念,他听不懂,也解决不了眼前的“糊口”问题。所谓的“可负担性危机”,就是生活成本已经压得人喘不过气了。
雷总
您说得对,远水解不了近渴。所以这个冲突就非常现实:长期的、结构性的解决方案,和眼前的、紧急的民生问题之间,存在着巨大的张力。政策制定者就像在走钢丝,既要考虑长远,又要应对眼前民众的不满和压力。
雷总
这种“K型经济”带来的影响,现在已经非常明显了。最直接的就是消费市场的两极分化。报告里有个惊人的数据,年收入超过25万美元的家庭,贡献了接近一半的消费支出。这说明什么?美国的消费引擎,现在主要靠“高档燃料”在跑。
董小姐
这就很危险。做企业最怕的就是客户群太单一。把所有希望都寄托在一小撮富人身上,一旦他们的财富,比如股市或者房市,出现大的波动,整个消费市场就会立刻熄火。这就像我们的生产线,如果某个核心部件只有一个供应商,那风险就太大了。
雷总
完全是这个道理。而且,这对中低收入家庭的影响是实实在在的。他们的名义支出可能每年增长了2.6%,但这个数字刚好和通货膨胀率差不多。也就是说,他们花的钱多了,但买到的东西和服务一点没变多,生活品质没有提升。只是在为更高的物价买单。
董小姐
所以企业也开始调整策略了。现在流行一个词,叫“杠铃策略”。就是产品线要么做非常高端的,服务那一小撮富人;要么就做非常平价的、走量的,服务大众。中间地带的产品,反而越来越难做。这对传统的中产阶级来说,不是个好消息,他们的选择变少了。
雷总
是的,这种策略会反过来加剧不平等。当市场被高端和低端占领,中间价位、品质还不错的选择消失了,中等收入群体的生活成本实际上是被动提高了。这就像一个恶性循环,整个社会的消费结构变得非常脆弱和不健康。
雷总
展望未来,情况可能更具挑战性。我们看到有预测说,未来五年,高达50%的入门级白领工作可能会被人工智能自动化。这对刚刚走出校门的Z世代来说,无疑是雪上加霜。他们本来就面临着“低雇佣”的市场,现在还要和AI竞争。
董小姐
技术进步是挡不住的,关键是我们怎么应对。不能让技术成为拉大差距的工具。企业要思考如何转型,如何培训员工掌握新的技能。政府也要有相应的配套政策,比如鼓励终身学习,为失业者提供更有效的再就业支持。不能等到问题积重难返了再来补救。
雷总
是的,否则我们可能会看到一个增长乏力的未来。虽然有超过一半的公司预计2026年收入会增长,但如果这个增长是建立在压榨成本和自动化、而不是广泛的消费增长之上,那这个增长的根基就是不稳的。我们需要的是一个更具包容性的增长模式。
雷总
好了,今天的讨论就到这里。核心的 takeaway 就是,Z世代和低收入群体的财务压力是一个普遍现象,这背后是深刻的“K型经济”结构。感谢收听 Goose Pod。
董小姐
没错,解决这个问题需要全社会共同努力,找到新的平衡点。感谢您的收听,我们明天再见。

摩根大通报告揭示,美国低薪劳动力市场正挤压Z世代和低收入群体。实际收入增长疲软,银行存款未增,消费信心下降。这源于“K型经济”分化,富人财富增长,工薪阶层停滞甚至缩水。未来AI冲击加剧,需包容性增长模式解决财务压力。

‘Just enough to spend, not enough to splurge’: The low-hire labor market bites for Gen Z and lower-income Americans, JPMorgan finds | Fortune

Read original at Fortune

The holiday season is on a budget this year. American households are entering the next festive few weeks with constrained spending power, a result of weak real income growth and a softened labor market that is disproportionately affecting younger and lower-income workers, according to a comprehensive financial health report from the JPMorgan Chase Institute.

The analysis, which leverages anonymized financial data from Chase customers, suggests that the period of relying on pandemic-era excess cash liquidity is now “in the rearview mirror,” and many consumers are facing a spending season where budgets are “tempered by tepid income growth.” For consumers who are “relatively disadvantaged by high housing costs and hold less stock market wealth”—a group that disproportionately includes younger and lower-income individuals—they may have “justenough to spend, but not enough to splurge” this year.

These findings come at the end of a year when voter anger over the cost of living unseated Democrats from the White House and installed President Donald Trump for a second, nonconsecutive term, only to see voters back Democrats across the board in off-year elections. Many of the benefactors, including New York City Mayor–elect Zohran Mamdani, stressed the “affordability” problem that many are facing, while Trump’s approval ratings on the economy have plummeted.

Gen Z has born the brunt of what Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell memorably called a “low-hire, low-fire” labor market, where it’s looking pretty frozen. “Kids coming out of college and younger people, minorities, are having a hard time finding jobs,” Powell told reporters in September. Several weeks later, Goldman Sachs economists warned that “jobless growth” might become a permanent feature of the economy.

Many economists have embraced a term from the Biden years that aligns with what JPMorgan is finding: “the K-shaped economy,” with diverging paths for wealthier and lower-income Americans.To be sure, while JPMorgan’s report does not touch on the political scene and the affordability politics of 2025, it paints a picture of a tenuously balanced economic environment, full of friction with low real income and insufficient wealth accumulation among key demographics.

Real income stagnation mirrors recessionary periodMedian real income growth has sustained a weak trend for several months, with the October 2025 reading for prime-age individuals (ages 25–54) settling at only 1.6% in real terms. This low sustained pace is near the range observed during the weak labor market of the early 2010s, a period when the unemployment rate averaged 7%.

This was, as the institute says, “when the unemployment rate was still elevated from the Great Recession,” although the current unemployment rate sits notably lower than in that period, at 4.3%.While nominal income growth remains roughly consistent with pre-pandemic levels, the higher pace of consumer price increases means real purchasing power gains are low.

This general stagnation is proving particularly challenging across demographics. Young people “continue to underperform the typical early career growth pattern” as income growth for individuals ages 25–29 is currently below historical trends for younger workers. Younger workers typically rely on job switching to rapidly advance their careers.

However, the current slowdown in hiring is hindering this typical rapid pace of income advancement.The downturn in overall income growth is also impacting older demographics. Workers ages 50–54 are now experiencing negative real year-over-year income growth. And since older workers generally face slower annual gains, a combination of weakening in the labor market and an uptick in inflation can more easily send their purchasing power into negative territory.

Negative real growth for older workers can lead to challenging adjustments, particularly for lower-wealth individuals who have not benefited from years of strong gains in housing and stock prices.Flat balances offer little cushionHouseholds’ median real cash balances have remained flat since early 2024, holding steady throughout most of 2025.

This stability marks a deviation from pre-pandemic trends, where real balances typically grew steadily at an annual rate of just over 6% as households aged. If balances had grown at that historical rate since 2020, they would be up 40% in October relative to 2019; instead, they are only up 23%.This flat growth indicates that households are not accumulating additional cash reserves in their checking and savings accounts.

Although high-income households have continued to see slight declines in their bank balances (only 2% negative in October 2025), potentially owing to transfers to higher-yield accounts or investment brokerage accounts, low-income households returned to positive year-over-year bank balance growth in September 2024.

Despite these shifts in savings strategy, the approximation of total cash reserves—including investment transfers—shows that growth has been positive for all income groups for at least the past year.Going into the end of the year, consumers with constrained budgets may look to stock market gains to augment spending.

However, the report cautions that these stock market gains are “highly unequally distributed,” leaving younger and lower-income groups with less of a financial cushion as they navigate stagnant real purchasing power.For this story, Fortune used generative AI to help with an initial draft. An editor verified the accuracy of the information before publishing.

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